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ABSTRACT: A flourishing research stream examining how accounting quality affects 
asset purchases ignores off-balance sheet leasing. This research concludes that low 
accounting quality limits firms‟ access to capital for investments. Our finding that low 
accounting quality firms lease more of their assets has important implications for 
interpreting this research. Although low accounting quality firms may purchase fewer 
assets, our results suggest that these firms may substitute leased assets for purchased 
assets. To verify that leasing does not merely reflect these firms‟ desire for off-balance 
sheet accounting but instead substitutes for accounting quality when addressing agency 
problems, we investigate how banks' private information and monitoring affect the 
relation between accounting quality and leasing. We find a lower association between 
accounting quality and leasing when banks‟ have higher monitoring incentives and when 
loans contain capital expenditure provisions. The mitigation of the negative relation 
between accounting quality and leasing by other information asymmetry and agency cost 
reducing mechanisms suggests that this association reflects the role of accounting quality 
in reducing information problems. These findings also document cross-sectional variation 
in accounting quality‟s affect on leasing. Our paper suggests that ignoring the substitution 
between leasing and asset purchases affects the inferences from prior research. 
 
Keywords: financial reporting quality; private information; monitoring; lease-versus-
buy  
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 1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
   A growing body of accounting research concludes that higher financial reporting 
quality reduces the negative effects of financing constraints on investment by mitigating 
information asymmetry (e.g. Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009, Lara, Osma, and Penalva, 
2009, Biddle and Hilary, 2006, Verdi, 2006, Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2006, Hope, 
Thomas, and Vyas, 2009). This research generally focuses on asset purchases without 
considering alternative investment mechanisms, like leases that account for about a third 
of new equipment investment for U.S. firms.
1
  This oversight seems especially important 
since both Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) and Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) find that firms 
facing greater financing constraints have a higher propensity to make off-balance sheet 
lease investments. Specifically, failing to consider the substitution between leasing and 
buying is likely to affect the inferences drawn from research examining the association 
between financial reporting quality and investment.  
We extend this research by considering the role of accounting quality in the firm‟s 
propensity to lease assets (i.e. the proportion of assets that the firm leases).  Both Sharpe 
and Nguyen (1995) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) argue that leases provide creditors 
with more security, higher priority in bankruptcy, and an effective way of reducing 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems that arise from information asymmetries. 
Consistent with these arguments, they find that firms facing financing constraints, due to 
information asymmetries, are more likely to lease than purchase assets. In a related 
research stream, Verdi (2006), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Biddle et al. (2009), and Lara et 
                                                 
1
 Hope et al. (2009) investigate the intermediate step of whether accounting quality (transparency) affects 
firms‟ ability to gain access to financing. 
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al. (2009) find that financial reporting quality alleviates the dampening effect of financial 
constraints on asset purchases by reducing information asymmetries.  We combine these 
two research streams, arguing that low accounting quality firms facing larger financing 
constraints due to greater information asymmetries will have a greater propensity to lease 
assets. 
To test this hypothesis we use a comprehensive sample of 3,033 manufacturing 
firms on the COMPUSTAT database. Our focus on manufacturing firms is consistent 
with previous research examining how financial constraints affect asset purchases.  In 
addition, focusing on a single industry reduces concerns that industry induced 
correlations between leasing, financing, and accounting drive our results.
2
  
We focus on the determinants of firms‟ propensities to use operating leases to 
acquire assets.  We measure the firms‟ propensity to lease by dividing the capitalized 
minimum operating lease payment by the sum of that amount and the amount of Property, 
Plant, and Equipment (PP&E). By capitalizing operating leases, the measure is unlikely 
to be affected by the differences in accounting treatment for leased versus purchased 
assets. To proxy for our primary variable of interest, financial reporting quality, we 
follow Bharath et al. (2008) by using the first principal component of three accrual-based 
accounting quality metrics.
3
 In our regressions, we also control for size, tax incentives, 
financing constraints, and other factors expected to affect leasing decisions.  
                                                 
2
 The statistical significance of the coefficients on our variables of interest is not sensitive to this choice.  
3
 As discussed in Appendix A, the three measures are Teoh, Welch, and Wong‟s (1998) absolute value of 
current discretionary accruals, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney‟s (1995) absolute value of total discretionary 
accruals, and the cross-sectional version of Dechow and Dichev‟s (2002) absolute value of current 
discretionary accruals. 
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We find that firms with worse financial reporting quality have a greater propensity 
to lease their assets.  This result highlights the importance of considering leasing when 
studying the effects of financial reporting quality on investments.  Without considering 
the leasing alternative, the existing research concludes that firms with poor accounting 
quality have financial constraints, inhibiting their ability to invest. Although low 
accounting quality firms may purchase fewer assets due to financial constraints, our 
results suggest that these firms may substitute leased assets for purchased assets. One 
interpretation of our finding that poor accounting quality firms lease more of their assets 
is that these firms substitute lease financing for other forms of secured borrowing. An 
alternative explanation for our finding is that the negative association between the 
proportion of assets leased and accounting quality merely reflects the desire of low 
accounting quality firms to engage in off-balance sheet financing.  
To distinguish between these alternatives, we investigate how other mechanisms 
that reduce information asymmetry and agency problems impact the relationship between 
accounting quality and leasing propensity. Specifically, we investigate how lenders' 
monitoring and loan covenants affect the association between accounting quality and 
leasing propensity. If the association between accounting quality and leasing reflects the 
role of accounting quality in reducing information asymmetry, then we would expect the 
negative relation between accounting quality and leasing to be mitigated by other 
information asymmetry and agency cost reducing mechanisms, suggesting that 
accounting quality and leasing are alternative ways to address financial constraints. 
Alternatively, if off-balance sheet accounting motivates firms with poor accounting 
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quality to lease, then the relationship between leasing and accounting quality should not 
be affected by other information asymmetry reducing mechanisms.  
In addition, this analysis allows us to extend Biddle and Hilary‟s (2006) 
investigation of whether cross-sectional differences in access and use of private 
information and monitoring affect the role of accounting quality in investment decisions. 
Specifically, Biddle and Hilary (2006) suggest that the role of accounting quality in 
capital investment decisions depends on the firm‟s use of other monitoring mechanisms 
that reduce information asymmetry.  We expand this conjecture, suggesting that both the 
quality of banks‟ monitoring and the covenants banks use to restrict investment will 
affect the importance of accounting quality in the lease-versus-buy decision.   
To test these hypotheses we use a sub-sample of manufacturing firms with 
syndicated bank loan data on either the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) or Security Data 
Corporation (SDC) databases. There are two primary reasons why we focus on this 
important sub-sample of the debt market.
4
  First, the variation in bank loan ownership 
provides cross-sectional variation in lenders‟ monitoring incentives. Lead lenders with 
proper financial incentives to conduct due diligence reviews prior to loan initiation and to 
provide loan monitoring over the life of the contract have incentives to reduce the agency 
problems induced by information asymmetries between lenders and opaque borrowers. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that when lead lenders have greater due diligence and 
monitoring incentives, the importance of the quality of accounting information in the 
lease-versus-buy decision will be mitigated.  
                                                 
4
 Sufi (2007) reports that syndicated loans represent 51% of U.S. corporate finance originations, and 
generates more underwriting fees than both equity and debt underwriting. He also notes that almost 90% of 
the largest 500 non-financial COMPUSTAT firms obtained a syndicated loan between 1994 and 2002. 
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The second advantage of focusing on syndicated loans is that, unlike public debt, 
there is cross-sectional variation in the use of contractual limitations on asset purchases in 
these loans.
5
  When a firm‟s debt contract contains an investment restriction covenant 
designed to mitigate the agency problems of debt, we expect the quality of accounting 
information will be less important in controlling information problems. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that the effect of accounting quality in the lease-versus-buy decision 
decreases in the face of investment restriction covenants. 
We identify a sub-sample of 997 manufacturing firms with loan ownership data in 
the LPC database to test our predictions about the effects of banks‟ direct and indirect 
monitoring on the role of accounting quality in the lease-versus-buy decision. Based on 
Sufi (2007) and Ball, Bushman and Vasvari (2007) we use lead lender ownership to 
proxy for lenders‟ due diligence and monitoring incentives. 6  Consistent with bank 
monitoring substituting for accounting information, we find that accounting quality is less 
important in the lease-versus-buy decision when lead lenders‟ ownership is high.7  
 We then examine the effects of contractual restrictions on asset purchases using a 
subsample of 865 manufacturing firms with information on the investment restriction 
covenant in the SDC database. We use an indicator variable to capture the effects of 
covenants on leasing decisions. Consistent with our previous analysis, we find that the 
magnitude of the correlation between our accounting quality measure and proportion of 
                                                 
5
 Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2007) find that 32% of U.S. bank loans contain this covenant, while we find that 
less than 5% of public debt uses this covenant to directly restrict firms‟ opportunistic investments.  
6
 In sensitivity tests, Sufi (2007) documents that the lead lender ownership measure is very robust. 
7
 The results on tests of the monitoring hypothesis and the investment restriction hypothesis are both robust 
to controls for self-selection.  In particular, we employ an endogenous switching model that controls for the 
endogeneity of the choice to have high lender monitoring, or the inclusion of an investment restriction.  
                                                                       6 
 
assets leased is lower in the presence of this covenant, suggesting that this covenant 
diminishes the importance of accounting information in the lease-versus-buy decision.  
Our results are robust to a variety of different research design choices. Specifically, 
we examine the sensitivity of our results to limiting our sample to manufacturing firms 
and to our choice of measures for leasing propensity, accounting quality, and lead lender 
measures.  We also investigate the sensitivity or our results to the methods we use to 
address endogeneity concerns, and the methods we use to address firms with missing 
lease data. Finally, we also investigate whether our results are affected when use an 
alternative research design to address cross-sectional variation in financing constraints.  
Our results are insensitive to each of these research design modifications. 
Our paper contributes to the accounting literature examining the role of accounting 
quality in investment decisions, and to the finance literature examining the determinants 
of the decision to lease-versus-buy assets. Our results indicate that firms with information 
asymmetries due to poor accounting quality are more likely to lease their assets. These 
findings suggest that ignoring the use of off-balance sheet leasing as a substitute for asset 
purchases is likely to affect the inferences about firms‟ investment policies that can be 
drawn from the existing research examining the association between accounting quality 
and asset purchases.  Our results also suggest that accounting quality is important in 
mitigating the financing constraints that lead firms to lease rather than buy assets. 
Our setting also allows us to test the conjecture made in previous research that 
banks‟ use of covenants, access to private information and monitoring are substitutes for 
accounting information in reducing information asymmetries. Our results suggest that 
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bank monitoring and covenant restrictions are substitutes for accounting quality‟s 
influence on investment decisions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the background to 
our study, Section 3 contains the hypothesis development, Section 4 discusses the sample 
selection and database, Section 5 displays the model specification, empirical results are 
presented in Section 6, robustness checks are reported in Section 7, and conclusions are 
drawn in Section 8.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Information Asymmetry and Investment  
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) examine the importance of capital market 
imperfections caused by information asymmetry between managers and outside capital 
providers on firm optimal investment decisions. They find that financially constrained 
firms rely on internally generated cash flows to fund their investments, increasing the 
sensitivity of their investments to cash flows.
8
  
Bushman et al. (2005), Hope et al. (2009), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Verdi (2006), 
Biddle et al. (2009), and Lara et al. (2009) suggest that aspects of the firms‟ accounting 
reports may affect the extent to which firm‟s information asymmetry problems affect 
their investments.  When accounting quality is high, information asymmetry is expected 
to be low, reducing the sensitivity of investment to cash flows (or increasing the firm‟s 
ability to make investments).  
                                                 
8
 Although many studies conclude that information asymmetry and financing constraints decrease 
investment efficiency, some argue that it is inappropriate to use investment-cash flow sensitivity to proxy 
for investment efficiency (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000, and Bushman, Smith and Zhang, 2007). 
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Using timely loss recognition as a measure of accounting quality, Bushman et al. 
(2005) investigate cross-country variation in the timeliness of loss recognition and the 
timeliness of change in investment policy.  They find that firms in countries with more 
timely loss recognition respond more quickly to declining investment opportunities by 
reducing net inflows of capital to new investments.  Their paper implies that better 
accounting quality leads to increased investment efficiency. 
Hope et al. (2009) investigate the relationship between financial reporting 
transparency and firm‟s ability to access capital.  They identify a sample of privately held 
firms with cross-sectional variation in whether an audit has been conducted, and find that 
audited firms with more transparent financial statements have better access to external 
finance. Their results imply that financial transparency influences information 
asymmetries, and thus influence firm‟s access to capital from traditional debt markets. 
Biddle and Hilary (2006) examine how accounting quality affects firms‟ 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. They examine the effect of accounting quality on 
shocks to investment.  They find that higher accounting quality is associated with lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivity.  They also find that accounting quality plays a relatively 
more important role in economies where the capital is primarily provided through arm‟s-
length transactions and investors do not have access to private information.  At the 
extreme, Biddle and Hilary (2006) find that in Japan, where capital is typically provided 
by keiretsu and banks, accounting quality does not affect the association between 
investment and cash flows. One of the implications of Biddle and Hilary‟s (2006) results 
is that firms with poor accounting quality are more likely to rely on internally generated 
cash flows to fund their investments, and thus they have more difficulty obtaining 
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external financing to fund their investments.  Their results also imply that the role of 
accounting quality in capital investment decisions depends on whether the firm uses other 
monitoring mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry. 
Verdi (2006), and Biddle et al. (2009) are concerned with both whether firms over-
invest in losing projects and with whether they under-invest in positive net-present-value 
projects. Both Verdi (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) find that financial reporting quality is 
positively correlated with investment when firms are prone to under-invest and is 
negatively correlated with investment when firms are prone to over-invest. They 
conclude that, “higher quality financial reporting enhances investment efficiency (for 
both capital and non-capital investment) by helping to mitigate both over- and under-
investment.” Lara et al. (2009), have a similar study and draw similar conclusions, but 
use an alternative measure of accounting quality. 
These studies focus on the role of accounting quality on either firms decisions to 
purchase assets (like PP&E) or their ability to obtain traditional financing, (like debt or 
equity).
9
  The results imply that firms with poor accounting quality have difficulty raising 
capital from either debt or equity markets, and thus invest sub-optimally. Thus firms with 
lower quality accounting are inefficient (have lower investment efficiency). In this paper, 
we extend this research by investigating whether firms with lower quality accounting are 
precluded from investment, or whether they can invest in assets through an alternative 
form of financing (an operating lease).   
                                                 
9
 The choice to study the effects of financing constraints on investment in assets on the balance sheet (like 
PP&E) is not unique to these papers.  Most of the finance research in this area follows this same approach. 
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Leasing and Financing Constraints 
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) and Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) find that firms with 
larger information asymmetries (greater financing constraints) are more likely to obtain 
their assets through leases.  Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) suggest that institutional features 
specific to operating leases provide lessors with important advantages in bankruptcy.
 10
 If 
the lessee goes bankrupt, the lessee can either accept or breach all lease obligations. If the 
lessee accepts the obligations, the lessor is entitled to continue receiving payments based 
on the original lease agreement. The rental expenses, along with lessors‟ other claims, are 
classified as administrative expenses in the bankruptcy code, which must be paid 
immediately or „within a reasonable period‟. 11  In this case, the bankruptcy filing does 
not change the status of the lessor‟s claims. Alternatively, if the lessee breaches the lease 
obligations, then the lessor can immediately repossess the property. Any economic losses 
accompanied with this repossession, including unpaid rents, late fees, or the loss 
regarding the re-lease or sale of the property is an unsecured claim against the lessee. In 
contrast, other creditors are left with no assurance that their claims will be recovered.
12
  
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) argue that the preferential treatment of leases in 
bankruptcy causes financially constrained firms to prefer to lease assets rather than 
borrow to buy assets. Consistent with this prediction they find that firms that are non-
dividend-paying, lower-rated, or cash-poor are more inclined to use operating leases than 
                                                 
10
 SFAS No. 13 requires leases to be classified as either operating or capital. A lease meeting any of the 
following four criteria is classified as a capital lease: (1) ownership of the leased asset is transferred to the 
lessee at lease maturity, (2) a bargain purchase option is available, (3) the lease term is equal to 75% or 
more of the remaining economic life of the leased asset, and (4) the present value of the minimum lease 
payments equals or exceeds 90% of the asset‟s market value.  
11
 Lessors‟ other claims might include, but not limited to, delinquencies, late fees, and other damages 
suffered. 
12
 This provision applies to operating leases, but not capital leases. If the original lease contract stipulates 
that the lessor does not retain property ownership at lease maturity, then the lease is treated as secured debt. 
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non-financially constrained firms. This suggests that firms with information asymmetries 
due to poor accounting quality may have other alternatives, like leasing, to fund their 
investments.     
Banks’ Private Information and Monitoring 
Biddle and Hilary (2006) suggest that there are other mechanisms that may 
substitute for accounting quality in reducing information asymmetry thereby alleviating 
financing restrictions and thus increasing investment efficiency.  In contrast to their 
findings for the U.S., Biddle and Hilary (2006) find that investment-cash flow 
sensitivities do not vary with accounting quality in Japan. They conjecture that, unlike 
U.S. markets, Japanese capital markets resolve information asymmetry problems through 
relationship banking and thereby public information loses its importance in affecting firm 
operations. Biddle and Hilary (2006) argue that banks‟ superior private information 
should serve as a substitute for accounting quality in determining the sensitivity of 
investment to internally generated cash flows.
13
  
In addition to having access to private information, Nini et al. (2006) suggest that 
bank loan contracts often include covenants setting an upper limit on capital expenditures 
and find that this capital expenditure restriction provision successfully reduces firms‟ 
capital expenditures.  They argue that the investment restriction covenant mitigates the 
asset substitution and overinvestment problems. Typically, in these covenants, capital 
expenditures are defined as assets included in the property, plant and equipment accounts 
under GAAP. Therefore, the covenants would restrict asset purchases and capital leases, 
                                                 
13
 This prediction is consistent with theoretical models such as Holthausen and Verrecchia (1998) 
                                                                       12 
 
but not operating leases, and thus are likely to affect both the use of operating leases, and 
the importance of accounting information in the leasing decision. 
The following excerpt from Georgia Pacific‟s December 2005 syndicated loan 
agreement is an illustration of a typical capital expenditure restriction: 
FINANCIAL COVENANTS 
 Maximum Capital Expenditures of up to:   
     
Fiscal Year        Capital Expenditures 
 2006      $ 900,000, 000 
 2007      $ 1,100, 000, 000 
 2008      $ 1,100, 000, 000 
2009  $ 900,000,000 
2010 and thereafter  $ 700,000,000 
 
The lesser of (a) 100% of the unused amounts allocated to any year and (b) 50% 
of the maximum Capital Expenditures permitted in such year shall be available 
for Capital Expenditures in the following fiscal year only. In addition, the Capital 
Expenditure covenant will permit the amount permitted, but not used, for 
Restricted Payments and investments in joint ventures under clause (12) of the 
definition of “Permitted Investments” to be used to make additional Capital 
Expenditures. Capital Expenditures shall exclude, whether or not such a 
designation would be in conformity with GAAP, expenditures made in connection 
with the replacement or restoration of property, to the extent reimbursed or 
financed from insurance or condemnation proceeds.  
 
 CERTAIN DEFINITIONS 
 
“Capital Expenditures” means, for any period and with respect to any Person, 
any and all expenditures made by the Parent or any of its Subsidiaries in such 
period for assets added to or reflected in its property, plant and equipment 
accounts or other similar capital asset accounts or comparable items or any other 
capital expenditures that are, or should be, set forth as “additions to plant, 
property and equipment” on the consolidated financial statements of the Parent 
prepared in accordance with GAAP, whether such asset is purchased for cash or 
financed as an account payable or by the incurrence of Indebtedness, accrued as a 
liability or otherwise.  
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III.  Hypothesis Development 
Two streams of research consider how firms mitigate the effects of financing 
constraints on investment. The first suggests that firms can reduce information 
asymmetry and financing constraints by committing to better accounting quality. The 
second finds that firms with larger financing constraints lease more of their assets. The 
joining of these two streams of research leads us to predict that firms with worse 
accounting quality are more likely to obtain their assets through operating leases. Our 
first hypothesis is:  
H1:     A firm‟s propensity to lease-versus-buy assets is declining in its 
accounting quality. 
 
An alternative explanation for a negative association between a firm‟s accounting 
quality and their propensity to enter into operating leases is that firms with poor 
accounting quality prefer off-balance sheet financing.  Under this alternative, we would 
expect the relationship between leasing and accounting quality to be unaffected by other 
mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry. 
One mechanism that is likely to affect the extent of the firm‟s information 
asymmetry problem is whether the outside suppliers of capital, such as banks, have 
incentives to obtain information through private channels and thus reduce information 
asymmetry. If better accounting quality reduces information asymmetry and thus reduces 
a firm‟s leasing propensity, then other mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry 
like the lenders‟ incentives to access private information and monitor the borrower are 
likely to affect the importance of accounting quality on the lease-versus-buy decision.  
Thus, our second hypothesis is:  
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H2:   The importance of accounting quality in the lease-versus-buy decision 
decreases with banks‟ incentives to perform due diligence. 
Capital expenditure covenants are another mechanism that lenders use to reduce 
agency costs.
14
 If these covenants are effective at reducing agency costs and financing 
constraints, then the importance of accounting quality in the lease-versus-buy decision 
will also be reduced by capital expenditure covenants. In other words, accounting quality 
affects the lease-versus-buy decision (i.e., low-quality accounting limits or makes it more 
costly for firms to engage in capital spending so they turn to leasing). However, capital 
expenditure covenants, by their very nature, also limit the ability of firms to engage in 
capital spending. Therefore, when a covenant is already in place, the incremental impact 
of accounting quality on the lease-versus-buy decision is reduced. For example, a firm 
with a covenant in place may have to opt for leasing, even though it has high-quality 
accounting.
15
   
Similar to our monitoring hypothesis, the negative association between a firm‟s 
accounting quality and their propensity to enter into operating leases could be due to 
firms with poor accounting quality preferring off-balance sheet financing.  Under this 
alternative hypothesis, we would expect the relationship between leasing and accounting 
quality to be unaffected by the use of capital investment restrictions. 
Thus, our third hypothesis is:  
                                                 
14 We focus on this covenant and not on other financial covenants for two reasons. First, this covenant 
restricts asset purchases, impacting the decision to lease vs. buy, which is the focus of our study. Second, 
this covenant is not based on any financial ratios or earnings numbers, so it is unaffected by the method of 
accounting for operating leases. 
 
15
 This argument might lead to the question of why this covenant is in place for a firm with high-accounting 
quality. In our investment covenant model reported in Table 7 we document that in addition to accounting 
quality there are many other important determinants of these covenants. Because of these other important 
determinants, high accounting quality firms could still have covenants.  
                                                                       15 
 
H3: The importance of accounting quality in the lease-versus-buy decision is 
lower in the presence of capital expenditure restriction provisions 
 
IV.  SAMPLE SELECTION  
We use three different samples to test our hypotheses. The first is a comprehensive 
sample of manufacturing firms included on COMPUSTAT. Our second and third samples 
are sub-samples of the first sample. The first sub-sample is restricted to firms with data 
on lead lenders contained on the LPC database. The second sub-sample requires data on 
capital expenditure covenants on the SDC database. 
 Comprehensive Sample 
 We test our first hypothesis on the role of accounting quality in the leasing 
decision using a comprehensive sample of COMPUSTAT manufacturing firms. We 
identified 3,033 firms in SIC codes (2000-3999) during the period 1995-2006 with the 
data necessary to measure the variables we use to test our hypotheses.  
Sub-Samples with Lead Lender and Capital Expenditure Covenant Data  
We use a sub-sample of firms that borrow in the syndicated loan market to probe 
the cross-sectional variation in the effect of accounting quality on leasing activities and to 
ensure our results are not an artifact of a desire for off-balance-sheet accounting. We 
focus on the syndicated loan market for two reasons. First, the variation in bank loan 
ownership provides cross-sectional variation in lenders‟ private information and 
monitoring incentives. As we discuss above, the syndicate structure provides loan owners 
varying incentives to incur costs to collect private information and to monitor 
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management (Sufi, 2007). Therefore, lead arrangers‟ ownership is an established proxy 
for the private information acquired and the quality of monitoring imposed by banks. 
The second reason we focus on this market rests on the use of debt covenants in 
this market. Since private lenders have informational and monitoring advantage over 
public debt holders in writing and enforcing debt covenants that mitigate the agency 
problems of debt (e.g., Fama, 1985 and Diamond, 1984), bank loans provide cross-
sectional variation in the use of debt covenants that is rare in corporate bonds. We exploit 
the variation of the use of the covenant restricting capital expenditures to investigate the 
effect of direct monitoring by banks on the lease-versus-buy decision. 
To test the relation between accounting quality and banks‟ private information and 
monitoring quality, we use a sample of 997 manufacturing firms that are covered by the 
LPC database and have loan ownership data. Consistent with prior research, to test our 
third hypothesis we use a sample of firms listed in the SDC syndicated loan database to 
identify firms that have investment restriction covenants. We identified 865 firms that are 
listed in the SDC database.      
V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROXIES 
 The basic model that we use to test all three of our hypotheses is the same, 
although the samples studied and the estimation techniques used to estimate the models 
differ across our tests. To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following model:  
Lease = β0 + β1*AccQual + β2*Nodiv + β3*Unrated + β4* Rating + β5* Size + β6*Loss + 
β7* MTR + ε 
16
                                              (1) 
Variable Definitions: 
                                                 
16
 Throughout the paper all t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level. 
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Lease:      the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96 
multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure 
(COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10).  
AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv:     An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Unrated:  An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Rating:   the average of S&P ratings when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between 
AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between 
BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:        the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12). 
Loss:       the average of the indicator variable for loss year, where the indicator variable 
equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:      the average of the marginal tax rates, based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique, as reported on his website.
17
 
 We capitalize the minimum lease payment assuming a cost of capital of 10 percent 
and that the lease payments are a perpetuity.
18
  As such, the measure will be unaffected 
by the differences in accounting treatment for these two investment strategies.
19
  
Following Bharath et al. (2008), we use accruals-based metrics to measure 
accounting quality (AccQual). They identify three common measures of accounting 
quality based on the work of Teoh et al. (1998), Dechow et al. (1995), and Dechow and 
Dichev (2002).  They use a principal component analysis to isolate the common 
component of these three firm-level accounting quality proxies. Appendix A includes a 
description of our implementation of the Bharath et al. (2008) measure. Our definition of 
                                                 
17
 To see a summary of the approach he uses to obtain marginal tax rates, and request access to the 
underlying data please visit the following website:  http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/ 
18
 While parsimonious, we recognize that this approach has drawbacks because the exact discount rate and 
payment timing is not known. To address these concerns, we also construct the variable discounting all 
future lease payments disclosed in the lease footnotes (5 years of payments and the thereafter piece), and 
varying the discount rate (between 8 and 12 percent)) and the results of our main tests are consistent with 
those reported.  Thus our capitalization assumptions do not appear to be driving our results.    
19
 In our paper, leases represent operating leases and therefore we use COMPUSTAT #96 to measure lease 
activities should be appropriate. Since capital leases are classified as borrow-and-buy in this paper and 
since COMPUSTAT #8 includes capital lease expenditures, our choice of this variable should be 
comprehensive. 
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variables differs from theirs slightly because we modify the deflator used in constructing 
these variables to accommodate differences in accounting for operating leases versus 
asset purchase.  The total asset deflator used in prior research would be affected by the 
off-balance sheet accounting treatment for operating leases. Instead, we use the sum of 
PP&E and capitalized minimum lease payment, which is the same deflator used in 
calculating our dependent variable (see Christie, 1991, for a discussion of the advantages 
of this approach.)
20
   
The lease versus buy decision is likely to be affected by a variety of other factors 
(see Smith and Wakeman, 1985, for a summary).  Taxes are one of the primary 
motivations for leasing.  Firms that are not paying taxes (or have low marginal tax rates) 
prefer to lease as opposed to buy, as leasing allows firms in a higher tax bracket to take 
more advantage of the depreciation deduction.  
Leasing is also likely to be related to whether the firm faces financing constraints.  
Following Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008), we include three 
variables to capture the financing constraints: Nodiv, Unrated and Rating. Non-dividend-
paying firms are expected to have more financing constraints and therefore are more 
likely to lease. Unrated firms are also expected to have higher leasing propensity. We 
expect that worse rated firms have greater difficulties in raising capital, so this variable 
should be positively correlated with Lease.   
We also include Size and Loss as control variables. Larger firms are likely to be 
less financially constrained and therefore Size is expected to have a negative coefficient. 
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 We also use total assets, total assets excluding Property, Plant and Equipment (COMPUSTAT #8) and 
sales (COMPUSTAT #12) as deflators, the results in the main analysis continue to hold. 
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Finally, we assume loss firms have a lower marginal tax rate and are thus unable to take 
full advantage of the tax benefits of ownership of equipment. Therefore, we expect Loss 
to be positively correlated with lease activity.  
It is important to note that we average all variables across the sample period 
thereby treating each firm as one observation rather than using panel data. There are 
several justifications for this research design choice.  First, our primary variable of 
interest is a stock measure of the leasing propensity. This measure, as well as our 
financial reporting quality measure, is highly correlated through time. Including one 
observation per firm year, would introduce serial correlation in both our dependent and 
independent variable.  Averaging our variables reduces the independence problems that 
arise from the serial correlation.  Although this approach only captures the between-firm 
effect, it eliminates within firm correlation issues. We investigate the sensitivity of our 
results to this research design choice using a variety of analyses that are discussed in 
depth in the sensitivity analysis section.  In particular, we replace the stock measure of 
leasing with a flow measure, and replace our accounting quality measure, with a measure 
using three years of data prior to the leasing decision, and find similar results.  
Comprehensive Sample 
To test our first hypothesis, we estimate equation (1) using OLS estimation for 
our comprehensive COMPUSTAT sample of manufacturing firms averaged over 1995-
2006. If accounting quality and leasing are two alternative mechanisms for dealing with 
financing constraints then we expect better accounting quality to be associated with a 
lower propensity to lease, i.e., β1 to be negative. 
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Analysis of Due Diligence Efforts 
To test our second hypothesis, we follow Bharath et al. (2008) and estimate an 
endogenous switching model (Lee, 1978) for our sub-sample of 997 manufacturing firms 
that are covered by the LPC database and have loan ownership data. The endogenous 
switching model allows us to control for the endogeneity of the choice by syndicate 
participants to require the lead arrangers to hold a larger ownership position in the loan to 
enhance their due diligence and monitoring efforts when the borrower has more serious 
information asymmetries and higher credit risk (Sufi, 2007).   
More specifically, the endogenous switching model has a “selection” equation 
modeling the syndication‟s decision to require lead lenders to hold a significant 
ownership position and two-second stage “regime” equations modeling the determinants 
of the firm‟s leasing propensity (one for firms where the lead lender holds a significant 
position, one for firms where the lead lender holds a relatively small amount of the loan). 
The three regressions are estimated simultaneously using full information maximum 
likelihood. As discussed in Bharath et al. (2008), this approach controls for the self-
selection associated with the decision by the syndicate to require the lead arranger to hold 
a relatively larger proportion of the loan and allows us to compare the effects of 
accounting quality on the firm‟s leasing propensity across the two “regimes”.  It also has 
the benefit of not requiring the coefficients on the determinants to lease to be the same 
across the two different regimes. 
  The selection model of the proportion of the loan held by the lead bank is a probit 
model as follows: 
Lead Rank = β0 + β1*AccQual + β2*Nodiv + β3*Unrated + β4* Rating + β5* Size 
+ β6*Loss + β7* MTR + β8*Loan + β9* Maturity  + ε               (2) 
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Most of the variables in equation (2) are also included in equation (1) and are 
defined above. To capture lead banks‟ incentives to acquire private information and 
monitor management we develop the measure Lead Rank. This variable is an indicator 
variable equal one if the average of the lead arrangers‟ ownership of the firm‟s bank 
loans exceeds the median of all sample firms, and zero otherwise.
21
 We also include two 
exogenous variables, (exogenous in the sense that they are likely to be associated with the 
syndicate‟s decision to require the lead lender to hold a significant proportion of the loan, 
but not associated with the firm‟s leasing propensity). The first exogenous variable is the 
size of the deal (Loan) and the second exogenous variable is the maturity of the debt 
(Maturity).  
We estimate two “regime” regressions, one for firms where the lead lender holds 
a relatively larger proportion of the loan, and one for the firms where the lead lender 
holds a relatively lower proportion of the loan.  Both of the second stage regime 
regressions are maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1). If debt holder monitoring 
is a potential substitute for accounting quality in solving information problems, then, in 
the regime regressions, we expect the effect of accounting quality (AccQual) on the 
leasing propensity will be relatively larger for firms where the lead lender holds a 
relatively smaller proportion of the loan.  To test this hypothesis, we conduct a chi-
squared test on the equality of the coefficient on accounting quality across the two regime 
regressions. 
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 Since firms may have more than one loan during the sample period, lead arranger ownership and other 
loan characteristics are weighted (by deal amount) and averaged over all bank loans issued during the 
sample period. Using equally weighted values does not change the tenor of the results. We examine the 
sensitivity of our results to the median cut-off in the robustness section. 
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Analysis of Capital Expenditure Covenant 
Similar to our tests of hypothesis 2, we again employ an endogenous switching 
model to test hypothesis 3, which predicts that the effects of investment restrictions on 
the importance of accounting quality on the firm‟s leasing propensity.  The selection 
model we employ in this analysis is as follows:   
Inv_Cov = β0 + β1*AccQual + β2*Nodiv + β3*Unrated + β4* Rating + β5* Size + 
β6*Loss + β7* MTR + β8*Loan + β9* Maturity  + ε                        (3) 
 
Most of the variables in equation (3) are also included in equation (1) and are 
defined above. Inv_Cov is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm ever includes a 
capital expenditure restriction provision in its bank loans during the sample period. The 
two “regime” regressions are the same as equation (1), except the partition is based on 
whether the firm‟s debt has an investment restriction (or not).  If this covenant is useful in 
reducing the asset substitution or over-investment problem, then we expect the effect of 
accounting quality (AccQual) on the lease versus buy decision to be reduced in the 
presence of this restrictive covenant.  
VI.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our comprehensive sample partitioned 
into two groups: firms that are relatively more likely to lease assets (the high lease group) 
and firms that are less likely to lease assets (the low lease group). The partition is done 
based on the median lease propensity in the sample and, by construction; the high lease 
group has a higher leasing propensity than the low lease group. The high lease group also 
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has lower accounting quality than the low lease group.  They are also less likely to pay 
dividends, less likely to be rated, and if they are rated, they are likely to have a poor 
credit rating, suggesting that firms that lease are more likely to face financing constraints.  
Finally, firms with a higher propensity to lease have more losses, and have lower 
marginal tax rates. 
Pearson correlations between our variables are reported in Table 2. The variables in 
this table are highly correlated, in a statistical sense, with p-value less than the 1% level. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, AccQual and Lease are negatively correlated. Also 
consistent with prior discussions, firms with financing constraints are more likely to lease 
than to purchase assets. In addition, Size and most variables (Nodiv, Unrated, Rating, 
and Loss) are highly correlated (over 50%). Loss and MTR are also highly correlated.   
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of firms with syndicated 
loan data.  In the second and third columns of Table 3, we partition the sample firms by 
the level of lead arranger ownership for the LPC sub-sample. Firms with better private 
information and monitoring quality, tend to be smaller, have worse accounting quality, 
and face more financial constraints. These firms are also characterized by a smaller debt 
size and shorter maturities. The fact that these firms have a greater propensity to lease is 
consistent with Sufi‟s (2007) finding that a high lead arranger ownership is associated 
with high information asymmetries and financing constraints. This observation suggests 
that it may be important to control for endogeneity before drawing any inferences.   
The fourth and fifth columns in Table 3 partition the SDC sub-sample firms by 
whether the firm‟s bank loans contain the capital expenditure restriction. Firms that use 
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this restrictive covenant tend to be smaller, lease less, face more financing constraints, 
and have lower performance. Also these firms have smaller loans with longer maturities.     
 Multivariate Results 
Panel A of Table 4 provides the results of the OLS estimation of Equation (1) for 
the comprehensive sample of manufacturing firms.  Consistent with our first hypothesis, 
we find that firms with worse accounting quality, i.e., low AccQual, have a greater 
propensity to lease assets. This result is both statistically and economically significant. 
For example, a standard deviation change in AccQual (standard deviation = 0.583) is 
associated with a 7.1% change in the mean Lease (mean= 0.436).
22
  
As for control variables, results on Nodiv, Unrated, Size, Loss and MTR are 
consistent with our predictions that firms with more financial constraints have a greater 
propensity to lease assets. For comparative purposes we repeat the analysis for the 
comprehensive sample on our lead lender sub-sample and report the results for this sub-
sample in Panel B of Table 4. The results on both our test and control variables are quite 
similar across these two samples. This suggests that any differences between our 
comprehensive sample of COMPUSTAT manufacturing firms and the sub-sample of 
these firms with syndicated loans do not affect our lease-versus-buy findings.  
We present the results on our tests of the effect of banks‟ due diligence incentives 
on the lease-versus-buy decision in Table 5.  In the first column of results we report the 
determinants of the leasing propensity for firms where the lead lender holds a relatively 
larger proportion of the loan (i.e. Lead Rank = 1). In the second column of results we 
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 While not reported, we find that the VIF of our accounting quality measure is 1.25, so our finding that 
financial reporting quality influences leasing activities is not driven by multi-collinearity. 
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report the determinants of the leasing propensity for firms where the lead lender holds a 
relatively smaller proportion of the loan (i.e. Lead Rank = 0).  
Focusing on the determinants to lease for firms where the lead lender has a stronger 
incentive to monitor, we find that smaller firms, firms that suffered a loss, and firms that 
aren‟t paying dividends are more likely to lease.  These results are consistent with the 
results in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) and Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) that firms that are 
more likely to have financing constraints have a greater propensity to lease.  We also find 
that AccQual has a significant negative coefficient, indicating that worse accounting 
quality is associated with a greater leasing propensity for firms with a high lead arranger 
ownership in bank loans.  
For firms where the lead lender has less monitoring incentives, we again find that 
AccQual has a significant negative coefficient, indicating that worse accounting quality is 
associated with a greater leasing propensity, but the magnitude of the coefficient is lower. 
We conduct a chi-squared test on the coefficient on accounting quality across these two 
regressions to test hypothesis 2.  We find that the coefficient on accounting quality is 
statistically larger for firms that have lenders with fewer monitoring incentives.  Thus, 
when information asymmetry problems are likely to be larger, accounting quality plays a 
relatively more important role in the leasing decision. 
We report the results of our tests of hypothesis 3 on the effects of direct monitoring 
via the capital expenditure covenant on the leasing propensity in Table 6. The first 
column reports the results on the determinants of the leasing propensity for firms with 
investment restriction covenants.  The second results column reports the determinants of 
the leasing propensity for firms without investment restriction covenants.  
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We find that for the subset of firms with investment covenants, the firms that are 
unrated, or are rated and have relatively poor ratings have a greater propensity to lease 
assets.  Similarly, for the subset of firms without investment covenants, we find that 
smaller firms and firms that have suffered losses have a greater propensity to lease assets.  
Similar to the results discussed above, these findings support the findings in Eisfeldt and 
Rampini (2008) and Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) that firms that are more likely to have 
financing constraints are more likely to lease. 
We find that accounting quality is an important determinant of the lease-versus-buy 
decision for firms without investment covenants, and is not a significant determinant of 
the leasing propensity for firms with these covenants.  A chi-squared test confirms that 
the effect of accounting quality on the leasing propensity is significantly different across 
these two regressions.  These results support our hypothesis that accounting quality is 
relatively less important in leasing decisions when other mechanisms limit capital 
spending.  Capital expenditure covenants, by their very nature, also limit the ability of 
firms to engage in capital spending. Therefore, when a covenant is already in place, the 
incremental impact of accounting quality on the lease-versus-buy decision is reduced. For 
example, a firm with a covenant in place may have to opt for leasing, even though it has 
high-quality accounting.  
For completeness, we report the results of our “selection” regressions in Table 7.  
Although we do not develop hypotheses about the determinants of lead arranger‟s 
monitoring incentives or of investment covenants, we do find that many of the 
explanatory variables included in the models are statistically significant.  Of particular 
importance are the coefficients on the variables that serve as exogenous instruments.  We 
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find that large lead arranger ownership decreases with loan amounts and maturities, while 
capital expenditure provisions increases with loan amount and maturities. 
VII. Robustness Checks 
Industry Composition  
We focus on the manufacturing industry to avoid the heterogeneity in financing, 
leasing and financial reporting choices across various industries. Untabulated results 
show that our findings continue to hold in analyses that include all industries and control 
for fixed industry effects. 
Lease Measure 
The main tabulated results are based on an approach that averages all variables 
across the sample period, where Lease is a stock measure. To show our results are not 
driven by this specific design, we also conduct a panel data analysis, where we measure 
accounting quality by averaging the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the 
three years prior to the measurement year of our leasing propensity variable. 
  We also define Lease using a flow measure, consistent with Sharpe and Nguyen 
(1995) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008). The flow measurement of Lease is defined as 
minimum lease payment (lagged COMPUSTAT #96) divided by the sum of lease and 
capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT #128). Table 8 shows that panel data analysis 
generates results consistent with our main approach, firms with higher accounting quality 
are less likely to lease than to buy.  
To verify the negative association between leasing and accounting quality we 
replace the scalar in our model with the sum of total assets and capitalized lease 
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obligations (COMPUSTAT # 6 + lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10). We 
continue to observe a significantly negative association between accounting quality and 
leasing indicating that firms with lower accounting quality lease more.  Finally, Tobit 
estimation including firms with missing lease data (about 8% of firms) produces similar 
results. 
Accounting Quality Measure 
In addition to using the principle component approach to measuring accruals 
quality, we also derive measures based on the underlying variables, and include those 
measures in the model.  Our results continue to hold when we use these underlying 
variables. To ensure the decision to use cross-sectional estimation is not affecting our 
results, we also use a time series measure of the extent of current accruals mapping into 
future, current, and future operating cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) as a metric 
for accounting quality. The results of using this time-series measure are consistent with 
the results of using cross-sectional models.  
Similarly, we change the scalar used in the accounting quality measures to be 
consistent with the scalar used on the independent variable, and to ensure that differences 
in the accounting treatment for leases is not driving our results.  If we use total assets as 
the scalar, we find results similar to those that we tabulate in the paper. 
Lead Rank Measure  
 Consistent with Sufi‟s (2007) findings, using a Herfindahl index of bank loan 
ownership in our lead rank proxy produces consistent results.   
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To test the sensitivity of our results to our choice of above version below the 
median lead ownership in defining our lead rank measure we examined two alternative 
cut-offs. Setting this variable equal one if the average of the lead arrangers‟ ownership of 
the firm‟s bank loans exceeds the 66th percentile of all sample firms, and zero otherwise 
produces similar results. Similarly, setting this variable equal one if the average of the 
lead arrangers‟ ownership of the firm‟s bank loans exceeds the 33th percentile of all 
sample firms, and zero otherwise produces similar results. The results of these alternative 
specifications suggest that our results are not driven by our median cut-off.
23
 
Financial Constraints 
Finally, when the firm has lower free cash flow information problems are more 
likely to affect investment efficiency through their effect on external financing. We 
interact accounting quality proxies with a dummy variable for high free cash flow. We 
find that the importance of accounting quality affecting leasing activities decreases with 
free cash flow, consistent with our prediction.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This paper extends prior research on the relation between financial reporting 
quality and firms‟ investment and financing choices by investigating the effect of 
financial reporting quality on the lease-versus-buy decision. Our research design 
complements prior studies that focus exclusively on asset purchases when examining the 
effect of accounting quality on firm‟s investment decisions. We find that the leasing 
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 We also tried a different specification where we interact continuous lead ownership with our accounting 
quality measure. The magnitude of the coefficient on AccQual decreases with lead ownership, consistent 
with the dichotomization approach.  
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propensity is declining in accounting quality. This finding suggests that although 
previous research shows that firms with poor accounting quality buy fewer assets, they 
lease more of their assets indicating that poor accounting quality may not result in lower 
total investment.  
To distinguish between two alternative explanations of this finding, we also 
examine the mechanisms lenders use to mitigate the agency problems arising from 
information asymmetries. Only if better accounting quality and leasing are two 
alternative mechanisms for addressing financial constraints would we expect the negative 
relation between accounting quality and leasing to be mitigated by other mechanism that 
reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. We find that accounting information is 
less important in the decision to lease when lenders‟ incentives to conduct due diligence 
are higher. The importance of financial reporting quality in the lease-versus-buy decision 
is also decreasing in the existence of capital expenditure covenants. Although the relation 
between leasing and accounting quality might be indicative of a propensity of firms with 
otherwise poor accounting quality to engage in off-balance sheet financing, our results 
are more consistent with accounting quality and leasing serving as substitute mechanisms 
for reducing financing constraints. 
Our findings suggest that ignoring the use of off-balance sheet leasing as a substitute for 
asset purchases is likely to affect the inferences about the effect of accounting quality on 
firm investment that can be drawn from the association between measures of information 
asymmetry, accounting quality, and asset purchases. Our analyses also contribute to the 
literature examining the importance of accounting information in firms‟ investment 
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decisions by considering how banks‟ private information and monitoring can substitute 
for accounting information.  
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APPENDIX A 
Construction of AccQual  
 
ABACC1: the absolute value of current discretionary accruals calculated based on Teoh 
et al. (1998). The model is estimated annually for each Fama/French (1997) 
industry group and each industry-year regression requires at least 20 observations. 
Based on Teoh et al. (1998) we first estimate the following regression to get the 
estimated coefficients (variables are defined below).  
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The second step calculates the absolute value of discretionary accruals as: 
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ABACC2: the absolute value of total discretionary accruals calculated based on Dechow 
et al. (1995). The model is estimated annually for each Fama/French (1997) 
industry group and each industry-year regression requires at least 20 observations. 
We first estimate the following regression to get the estimated coefficients 
(variables are defined below).  
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The second step calculates the absolute value of discretionary accruals as: 
  
|
_
ˆ
_
)Re(
ˆ
_
1
ˆ
_
_
| 321
InvTotal
PPE
InvTotal
ARv
InvTotalInvTotal
AccTotal
 

  
 
ABACC3: the absolute value of total current accruals calculated based on  Dechow and 
Dichev (2002). The model is estimated annually for each Fama/French (1997) 
industry group and each industry-year regression requires at least 20 observations. 
ABACC3 is the absolute value of the estimated residual from the following model.  
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Current_Acc = Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flow from operating 
activities – Depreciation (COMPUSTAT #123 –  #308 +  #14);24 
Total_Acc      = Earnings before extraordinary items – Cash flow from operating 
activities (COMPUSTAT #123 –  #308); 
Total_Inv      = the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure (COMPUSTAT 
#8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10); 
CFO               = Cash flow from operating activities (COMPUSTAT #308); 
ΔRev               = Change in sales (COMPUTSTAT #12); 
ΔAR                = Change in accounts receivables (COMPUSTAT #2). 
PPE                = property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT #8).  
 
We standardize each of the three measures by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation, and then extract the first principal component from the three 
proxies.
25
 Our accounting quality variable (AccQual) is thus defined as the average of the 
following metric over the sample period 1995-2006:   
-1*[standardizedABACC1*0.38538 + standardizedABACC2*0.38371 + 
standardized ABACC3*0.32568]
26
 
                                                 
24
 In robustness checks, we adjust the current accruals by excluding change in prepaid rental expenses to 
accommodate differences in accounting for operating leases vs. asset purchase, and this adjustment does 
not affect the results.  
25
 The first principal component explains on average about 80 percent of the corresponding cross-sectional 
sample variance and only the first Eigen value is greater than one. We therefore conclude that the first 
principal component captures most of the common variation among the three proxies.     
26
 We multiply by negative one to make the metric higher for firms with better accounting quality. The 
Pearson correlations between the first principal component and the three accounting quality proxies are 
very high, ranging from  -80% to -95%.    
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics (means and medians) for sample firms partitioned by their 
leasing propensity for the period 1995-2006 
 
 High Lease  Low Lease 
 Mean Median Mean 
(t-stat for high lease - 
low Lease) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon z-stat for high 
lease  -  low Lease) 
Lease 0.650 0.652 0.223 
(94.54)*** 
0.223 
(47.69)*** 
AccQual -0.147 0.079 0.217 
(-18.11)*** 
0.348 
(-22.63)*** 
Nodiv 0.822 1.000 
 
0.464 
(22.15)*** 
0.000 
(20.55)*** 
Unrated 0.880 1.000 0.584 
(19.50)*** 
1.000 
(18.38)*** 
Rating+ 3.604 4.000 3.134 
(6.53)*** 
3.250 
(6.67)*** 
Size  3.194 3.000 5.807 
(-28.14)*** 
6.000 
(-25.06)*** 
Loss 0.580 0.600 0.282 
(25.73)*** 
0.200 
(23.23)*** 
MTR 0.108 0.054 0.198 
(-20.58)*** 
0.214 
(-20.20)*** 
Number of 
observations 
1,517 1,517 1,516 1,516 
Note: High Lease (Low Lease) include firms with Lease above (below) the median.    
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
+     The mean (median) values of this variable only apply to firms rated by the S&P. 
Variable Definitions: 
Lease:      the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96 
multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure 
(COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10) .  
AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv:     An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Unrated: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Rating:    the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between 
AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between 
BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:         the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12) . 
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Loss:        the average of the indicator variable for loss year , where the indicator variable 
equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:      the average of the marginal tax rates , based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique . As reported on his website.   
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TABLE 2 
Pearson correlation coefficients (p-values) for lease model variables during the 
period 1995-2006 
Variables Lease AccQual Nodiv Unrated Rating Size Loss MTR 
Lease 1 -0.351 
(0.001) 
0.399 
(0.001) 
0.369 
(0.001) 
0.298 
(0.001) 
-0.532 
(0.001) 
0.471 
(0.001) 
-0.387 
(0.001) 
AccQual  1 -0.301 
(0.001) 
-0.233 
(0.001) 
-0.191 
(0.001) 
0.398 
(0.001) 
-0.398 
(0.001) 
0.318 
(0.001) 
Nodiv   1 0.363 
(0.001) 
0.482 
(0.001) 
-0.552 
(0.001) 
0.501 
(0.001) 
-0.417 
(0.001) 
Unrated    1 N/A -0.658 
(0.001) 
0.312 
(0.001) 
-0.192 
(0.001) 
Rating     1 -0.568 
(0.001) 
0.495 
(0.001) 
-0.309 
(0.001) 
Size      1 -0.644 
(0.001) 
0.492 
(0.001) 
Loss       1 -0.695 
(0.001) 
MTR        1 
Note: Correlations with Rating only apply to firms that are rated by the S&P. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Lease:      the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96 
multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure 
(COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10) .  
AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv:     An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Unrated: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Rating:    the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between 
AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between 
BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:         the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12) . 
Loss:        the average of the indicator variable for loss year , where the indicator variable 
equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:      the average of the marginal tax rates , based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique . As reported on his website.   
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics (means) for sample firms partitioned on whether the firm uses 
a capital expenditure restriction in bank loans and the lead lenders’ ownership of 
bank loans for the period 1995-2006 
 High Lead 
Arrangers‟ 
Ownership 
Low Ownership (t-
stat for difference) 
With Capital 
Expenditure 
Restrictions 
Without 
Restrictions (t-stat 
for difference) 
Lease 0.458 0.316 
(10.58)*** 
0.371 0.325 
(3.40)*** 
AccQual 0.071 0.302 
(-9.94)*** 
0.223 0.249 
(-1.02) 
Nodiv 0.728 0.315 
(14.29)*** 
0.556 0.391 
(4.82)*** 
Unrated 0.888 0.359 
(20.52)*** 
0.497 0.493 
(0.13) 
Rating+ 3.802 3.097 
(6.19)*** 
3.792 3.002 
(12.17)*** 
Size 3.814 7.424 
(-32.14)*** 
6.158 6.632 
(-3.75)*** 
Loss 0.423 0.183 
(14.00)*** 
0.319 0.226 
(5.16)*** 
MTR 0.157 0.213 
(-7.45)*** 
0.185 0.208 
(-2.90)*** 
Lead Own 89.624 24.218 
(69.44)*** 
N/A N/A 
Loan 16.364 19.433 
(-41.35)*** 
18.091 18.326 
(-2.13)** 
Maturity 3.367 3.869 
(-12.80)*** 
3.770 3.591 
(5.16)*** 
Number of 
observations 
499 498 374 491 
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
+   The mean values of this variable only apply to firms that are rated by the S&P. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Lease:          the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96 
multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure 
(COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10) .  
AccQual:     the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality 
metrics based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv:          An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
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Unrated:      An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Rating:         the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is 
between AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is 
between BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:              the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT 
#12) . 
Loss:            the average of the indicator variable for loss year , where the indicator 
variable equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:           the average of the marginal tax rates , based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique. As reported on his website.   
Lead Own: The weighted average of the lead arrangers‟ ownership of the bank loan 
issued in the sample period. 
Loan:           The natural of log of the amount of bank loan issued in the sample period. 
Maturity:    The natural of log of the maturity (in months) of bank loan issued in the 
sample period. 
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TABLE 4 
Coefficients (and t-statistics) from OLS estimations of the determinants of the extent 
of firms’ expenditures on operating leases  
Panel A: Complete Sample 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients 
 
t-stats 
Intercept +/- 0.442 10.18*** 
AccQual - -0.053 -4.00*** 
Nodiv + 0.048 3.35*** 
Unrated + 0.057 1.67* 
Rating + 0.003 0.34 
Size - -0.022 -7.26*** 
Loss + 0.094 3.75*** 
MTR - -0.143 -2.88*** 
Number of 
observations 
 3,033  
R-Squared  0.3382  
 
Panel B: Syndicated Loan Sample  
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients 
 
t-stats 
Intercept +/- 0.467 7.37*** 
AccQual - -0.074 -3.32*** 
Nodiv + 0.036 2.21** 
Unrated + 0.028 0.73 
Rating + 0.003 0.32 
Size - -0.021 -4.32*** 
Loss + 0.085 2.66*** 
MTR - -0.102 -1.86* 
Number of 
observations 
 1,314  
R-Squared  0.2414  
 
Note: All t-statistics are based on clustering at the 3-digit industry level 
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Lease:     the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96 
multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure 
(COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10) .  
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AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv:     An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Unrated: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Rating:    the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between 
AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between 
BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:         the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12) . 
Loss:        the average of the indicator variable for loss year , where the indicator variable 
equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:      the average of the marginal tax rates, based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique, as reported on his website.   
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TABLE 5 
Coefficients (and t-statistics) from endogenous switching models estimating how 
quality monitoring by banks, measured by lead lenders’ ownership, affects the effect 
of accounting quality on lease expenditures 
 
  Lead Rank = 1 Lead Rank = 0 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients 
(z-stats) 
Coefficients 
(z-stats) 
Intercept +/- 0.455 
(1.75)* 
0.402 
(4.78)*** 
AccQual - -0.053 
(-2.22)** 
-0.211 
(-6.48)*** 
Nodiv + 0.073 
(3.11)*** 
0.043 
(2.26)** 
Unrated + 0.044 
(0.17) 
0.063 
(1.29) 
Rating + 0.006 
(0.10) 
0.011 
(0.83) 
Size - -0.020 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.011 
(-1.45) 
Loss + 0.090 
(1.98)** 
0.053 
(1.24) 
MTR - -0.253 
(-2.26)** 
-0.015 
(-0.21) 
Number of 
observations 
 472 492 
Differences in the impact of accounting quality on the lease vs. buy decision 
H0: AccQual (Lead Rank=1) = AccQual (Lead Rank=0) 
2  (1) = 15.42 
p value = 0.0001 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Lead Rank: an indicator variable equal one if the average of the lead arrangers‟ 
ownership of the firm‟s bank loans exceeds the median of all sample firms, and 
zero otherwise 
Lease:      the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96 
multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure 
(COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10) .  
AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
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Nodiv:     An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Unrated: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Rating:    the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between 
AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between 
BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:        the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12) . 
Loss:       the average of the indicator variable for loss year , where the indicator variable 
equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:      the average of the marginal tax rates based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique, as reported on his website.   
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TABLE 6 
Coefficients (and t-statistics) from endogenous switching model estimation of  the 
effect of capital expenditure restrictions on firms’ leasing propensity 
 
  Inv_Cov = 1 Inv_Cov=0 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients 
(z-stats) 
Coefficients 
(z-stats) 
Intercept +/- -0.602 
(-2.66)*** 
0.364 
(5.18)*** 
AccQual - -0.005 
(-0.15) 
-0.104 
(-4.51)*** 
Nodiv + 0.038 
(1.31) 
0.133 
(0.66) 
Unrated + 0.841 
(4.61)*** 
0.084 
(1.24) 
Rating + 0.234 
(4.77)*** 
0.018 
(0.93) 
Size - -0.018 
(-1.89)* 
-0.013 
(-2.40)** 
Loss + 0.053 
(0.89) 
0.114 
(2.75)*** 
MTR - -0.184 
(-1.38) 
-0.027 
(-0.35) 
Number of 
observations 
 373 483 
Differences in the impact of accounting quality on the lease vs. buy decision 
H0: AccQual (Inv_Cov=1) = AccQual (Inv_Cov=0) 
2  (1) =5.66 
p value = 0.017 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Inv_Cov:  is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm ever includes a capital 
expenditure restriction provision in its bank loans during the sample period. 
Lease:      the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96 
multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized lease expenditure 
(COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10) .  
AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv:     An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Unrated:  An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
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Rating:    the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between 
AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between 
BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:        the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12) . 
Loss:       the average of the indicator variable for loss year , where the indicator variable 
equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:     the average of the marginal tax rates , based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique, as reported on his website.   
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TABLE 7 
Coefficients (and z-statistics) from Probit models examining the determinants of the 
lead lenders’ ownership and use of capital expenditure provisions for the period 
1995-2006 
  Dependent variable: 
Lead Rank 
Dependent variable: 
Inv_Cov 
Variables Prediction Coefficients 
(z-stats) 
Coefficients 
(z-stats) 
Intercept +/- 23.211 
(10.98)*** 
-6.531 
(-5.82)*** 
AccQual - 0.055 
(0.25) 
0.104 
(0.82) 
Nodiv + -0.041 
(-0.27) 
0.077 
(0.71) 
Unrated + -1.228 
(-1.73)* 
3.396 
(6.15)*** 
Rating + -0.250 
(-1.28) 
0.984 
(6.52)*** 
Size - -0.146 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.104 
(-2.25)** 
Loss + 0.391 
(1.19) 
0.486 
(2.35)** 
MTR +/- 1.111 
(1.96)** 
0.051 
(0.11) 
Loan +/- -1.132 
(-10.81)*** 
0.010 
(1.78)* 
Maturity +/- -0.314 
(-2.43)** 
0.440 
(4.28)*** 
Number of observations  964 856 
Pseudo R-squared  0.6732 0.1442 
Note: All z-statistics are based on clustering at the 3-digit industry level.  
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Lead Rank: an indicator variable equal one if the average of the lead arrangers‟ 
ownership of the firm‟s bank loans exceeds the median of all sample firms, and 
zero otherwise 
 Inv_Cov:  is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm ever includes a capital 
expenditure restriction provision in its bank loans during the sample period. 
Lease:      Measured as the average of the capitalized lease expenditure (lagged 
COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied by 10) over the sum of PP&E and capitalized 
lease expenditure (COMPUSTAT #8+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96 multiplied 
by 10) .  
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AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv:     An indicator variable equal to one if the firm never pays dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Unrated: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is never rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280) during the sample period, and zero otherwise.  
Rating:    the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between 
AAA and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between 
BBB+ and BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size:         the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12) . 
Loss:        the average of the indicator variable for loss year , where the indicator variable 
equals one when the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR:      the average of the marginal tax rates , based on John Graham‟s simulation 
technique . As reported on his website.   
Lead Own: The weighted average of the lead arrangers‟ ownership of the bank loan  
issued in the sample period. 
Loan:       The natural of log of the size of bank loan issued in the sample period. 
Maturity: The natural of log of the maturity (in months) of bank loan issued in the 
sample period. 
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TABLE 8 
Coefficients (and t-statistics) from OLS estimations of the determinants of the extent 
of firms’ expenditures on operating leases for the period 1995-2006 estimated using 
an annual regression and flow measures of lease proclivity 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients 
 
t-stats 
Intercept +/- 0.522 19.68*** 
AccQual - -0.042 -5.98*** 
Nodiv + 0.070 6.54*** 
Unrated + 0.056 2.27** 
Rating + 0.005 0.69 
Size - -0.029 -14.69*** 
Loss + 0.030 4.14*** 
MTR - -0.135 -5.50*** 
Number of 
observations 
 15,055  
R-Squared  0.3021  
Note: All t-statistics are based on clustering at the firm level. Results on time fixed 
effects are omitted. 
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Lease: the lease expenditure (lagged COMPUSTAT #96) over the sum of capital and 
lease expenditures (COMPUSTAT #128+ lagged COMPUSTAT #96) .  
AccQual: the first principal component of three accrual-based accounting quality metrics 
based on Bharath et al. (2008) (described in Appendix A). 
Nodiv: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm does not pay a dividend 
(COMPUSTAT #21), and zero otherwise.  
Unrated: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is not rated by the S&P 
(COMPUSTAT #280), and zero otherwise.  
Rating: the average of S&P ratings  when the firm is rated by the S&P. Following 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), the rating is coded 1 if the S&P rating is between AAA 
and A-, 2 if the rating is between A+ and A-, 3 if the rating is between BBB+ and 
BBB-, and 4 if the rating is between BB+ and D.  
Size: the decile ranking of average of the natural log of sales (COMPUSTAT #12) . 
Loss: an indicator variable for loss year, where the indicator variable equals one when 
the COMPUSTAT #123 is less than zero. 
MTR: the marginal tax rates based on John Graham‟s simulation technique, as reported 
on his website. 
 
 
